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J. C. LESTER  
A reply to the Andrew I. Cohen review of Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare, and 
Anarchy Reconciled, in Ideas on Liberty, March 2002, 58-59 (the review). 
Primarily using philosophy, but also some social science, Escape from Leviathan (EFL) 
explains and defends what it calls an extreme version of the implicit ‘classical liberal 
compatibility thesis’: liberty, welfare, and anarchy are overwhelmingly complementary in 
normal practice (rationality is added for its intimate theoretical connections to these categories). 
This is done using theories, not definitions, of each concept.1 This important thesis is entirely 
positive. Therefore, somewhat unusually, all normative issues are avoided as irrelevant 
distractions in this context. In addition, the epistemology used is also unorthodox. A 
justificationist, or foundationalist, approach would be literally illogical: the self-refuting 
trilemma faced by ‘supporting justifications’ (as regards arguments and evidence) is of 
entailing infinite regresses, dogmatic starting points, or circularities. Consequently, critical 
rationalism is assumed: conjecture and criticism are all that is possible.2 Thus all aspects of the 
conjectured thesis are explained and defended from criticism as thoroughly as the book can 
encompass. It is concluded that the thesis has not been refuted and so may be critically 
preferred. (However, this could all still be viewed as a ‘justification’ by those thus inclined.) 
All of this is made clear enough in the short introductory chapter and repeated where relevant 
throughout. Yet some reviews do not have a firm grasp of the specific project and so reject it 
with unsound criticisms. We now turn to one such example. 
This reply focuses on any disagreements with the review in the order in which they arise. There 
is no shortage of these, but not many are with what EFL actually says. It is always better to 
reply to criticisms of what is actually argued. And it is even better to have those arguments 
refuted: for then we have progress. It would also be useful to have some page references, 
especially when the review attempts paraphrases of what EFL says. But we have to start from 
where we are. 
The review begins with the observation that as EFL “focuses entirely on criticisms of 
libertarianism, a less felicitous but more descriptive subtitle would be: ‘Against Arguments 
that Liberty, Welfare, and Anarchy are Incompatible’” (58). Properly understood, the actual 
subtitle is not less accurate. How else can one attempt to reconcile these three things except by 
explaining how they are being theorised and dealing with arguments purporting to show that 
they cannot be reconciled? (The reconciliation remains conjectural, not established.) Perhaps 
the implication is that there could be some kind of supporting justification as a possible 
alternative way of reconciling them. But it is an explained assumption of the book that this is 
not an epistemological possibility. Hence, EFL attempts a reconciliation using the critical-
 
1 Theories are about the world; definitions are about words. Only realistic theories can defend 
a thesis about the world. 
2 ‘Criticism’ here includes tests of all kinds. For detailed explanations of critical rationalism 
see, for instance, K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, [1963] 1978) and D. W. Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence 
(Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1994). 
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rationalist method. But adding the epistemological method to the subtitle would seem to 
distract from the central thesis, as well as being unwieldy.3 
How far is it right that EFL “applies Karl Popper’s theory of knowledge to social theory”? It is 
certainly applying it to a particular thesis that includes aspects of social theory, but also many 
philosophical issues.  Only in the section (135-142) that tries to explain how Popper 
misinterprets the social and political implications of his epistemology is it tackling social theory 
more broadly, however briefly (unfortunately, Popper eventually became too unwell to produce 
the reply to this section that he had once promised). It is not right that “on Popper’s view, we 
ought to uphold theories that withstand efforts at disproof by critics” (emphases added). Rather, 
we may continue to conjecture that those theories might be true and continue to try to disprove 
them ourselves; but critics can aid us in this task. And rather than saying that EFL defends a 
“completely unregulated market”, as the review asserts, it would be more accurate to say that 
it defends private-property anarchy—which is broader than market transactions—regulated by 
libertarian principles derived from the abstract theory (using freely-competing security and 
arbitration agencies when needed). 
We are told that EFL’s “approach could furnish a weapon in the arsenal against anti-
liberalism”. This appears again to suggest, or hint, that it fails as a weapon for justifying or 
establishing “liberalism” (i.e., classical liberalism; more narrowly, libertarianism). But such a 
justifying weapon is not logically possible. It is possible to have conjectural explanations of 
how libertarianism should be understood and how it works. There are many such explanations 
throughout the book. And these could mistakenly be interpreted as ‘supporting justifications’. 
However, for libertarianism to succeed it is necessary and sufficient that all the best anti-
libertarian criticisms are generally accepted as being refuted (however, movements in the right 
direction are possible on a case-by-case basis). 
EFL itself explains, but as the review puts it, that it moves with “considerable, sometimes 
blinding, speed against critics of liberalism”. This is not only because, as the review correctly 
paraphrases, readers are free to check the original sources and any errors of interpretation might 
have remained even if dealt with at greater length. It is also because of the vast amount of 
criticism that needs to be covered to defend the compatibility thesis reasonably 
comprehensively. If there are significant misrepresentations or errors in the responses, then it 
would have been better if the review explained, or at least cited, some of them rather than 
merely implying that they might be there. There does not seem to be anything wrong with 
“speed” as such. On the contrary, short and sweet refutations—if sound—are an economy and 
a delight. Therefore, it seems a mistake to hold that brevity entails being “cursory” 
(superficially quick) in reviewing key arguments that “presuppose an intimate familiarity with 
scholarly criticisms of liberalism” without an example of where this is alleged to be a problem. 
In fact, it appears that the “layperson”—non-philosopher—can indeed get to grips with most 
of EFL: many correspondents have done so since its publication. It has not proven to be of 
“little value” to the non-philosopher just because there are some difficult patches. The review 
then suggests that EFL “has some value as an anti-anti-liberal guidebook”. But what would be 
the use of a ‘pro-liberal’ book that ignores criticism? And does “guidebook” mean to imply 
 
3 However, the paperback (The University of Buckingham Press, 2012) now attempts to clarify 
matters with a subtitle of “Libertarianism Without Justificationism”—with “Rationality, 
Welfare, Liberty, and Anarchy Reconciled” as a sub-subtitle only within the book. 
3 
 
that the replies to criticisms are seriously inadequate in themselves? If so, some alleged 
examples would be useful. 
The review’s exposition of EFL’s a priori interpretation of homo economicus requires 
qualifications (these are all attempted paraphrases with no page references and no quotations 
from the book). We are told that “rational persons invariably calculate how best to promote 
their perceived interests”. No, they do not perfectly calculate over time, but calculate as best 
they can given their current abilities and how they perceive the world and their interests at the 
time. And “persons rationally care for others” (59) only to the extent that they are interested in 
those others as ends in themselves. It is not stated in EFL that “each of us acts by definition as 
a ‘purposeful maximizer’” (emphasis in review). It is argued (i.e., conjecturally explained) 
following the Austrian School of economics to be an a priori truth (or towards that end of the 
a priori-empirical spectrum, at least). While this argument is held to be “non-moral and value-
neutral” it is not exactly used in a “derivation of the market system,” as the review states. It is 
used in various ways to defend the compatibility thesis. And, as critical rationalist epistemology 
is assumed in EFL, these cannot be the “foundations” that the review alleges they are intended 
to be. Note that throughout this reply we have various real errors of exposition and unsound 
responses; there is no objection to the mere “speed” at which this was done, of course.4 
To be clear, EFL does not state or imply that outside of its particular thesis we can “dispense 
with the complexities of moral argument” for liberty (which the review insists on restricting to 
“the market”). We are then told that EFL “stacks the deck by excluding certain considerations 
from counting as costs or benefits, so [it] can pretend this whole enterprise is purely 
descriptive”. Which considerations are illegitimately excluded and in what way are they 
illegitimate? Replying to guesses as to what might be intended is likely to be a waste of time. 
And why allege that EFL must “pretend” (i.e., dishonestly purport) to be being descriptive 
rather than simply being mistaken? Isn’t a mistake always more likely? And what would be the 
point of dishonesty here? In any case, isn’t explaining—or at least specifying—the alleged 
errors the only thing that is philosophically relevant? 
The review goes on to allege one example of “robust evaluative work going on behind the 
scenes” when it says, 
This is clear in his effort to derive non-morally a system of ownership. But if property 
is taken to entail, as it usually does, a host of moral considerations, then we cannot 
derive a system of property simply from descriptive claims. (59) 
In other words, the review does not try to show the faults in the actual philosophical argument 
that attempts to derive property positively from applying the, also positive, abstract theory of 
liberty.5 Instead, it completely ignores the argument and falls back on its presuppositions. Why 
do anything so anti-philosophical? It then states that “Either the system of property he derives 
is of no normative consequence, or it involves the norms typically entailed by property and so 
 
4 For a more detailed, and recent, defence of an Austrian interpretation of Homo Economicus 
see “Adversus ‘Adversus Homo Economicus’: Critique of the ‘Critique of Lester’s Account of 
Instrumental Rationality’ (https://philpapers.org/rec/LESAAH-2). 
5 For a brief explanation see “How Abstract Liberty Relates to Private Property: a One-Page 
Outline” (https://philpapers.org/rec/LESTAL). For more detail see “The Heterodox ‘Fourth 
Paradigm’ of Libertarianism: an Abstract Eleutherology plus Critical Rationalism”, Journal of 
Libertarian Studies 23: 91-116 (2019) (https://philpapers.org/rec/LESQCL).  
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is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy”. Yes, the system of property is—and is intended to be—of 
no normative consequence in itself. EFL is not arguing here about what people ought to do but 
about what an abstract theory of libertarian liberty entails when applied. The compatibility 
thesis is positive and not normative. That hardly makes it unimportant or uninteresting. 
The review then explains its own preferred approach: “Perhaps instead we should offer moral 
arguments to justify the consequences markets promote. This requires rolling up our sleeves 
and presenting some moral theory to undergird liberalism.” There is certainly a place for moral 
arguments, but it is not while defending an objective thesis. There is never a place for trying to 
“justify” and “undergird” anything. The review merely ignores the epistemological arguments 
given in EFL for not attempting to do so. It would have done better to adopt a policy of “rolling 
up our sleeves and presenting some” precise philosophical analysis. 
EFL does not defend “preference consequentialism” as a moral theory, as the review might 
appear to suggest, but only as a plausible theory of welfare. We are asked, “But what if 
aggregate preferences could best be satisfied by violating the rights of minorities? What 
protection does anarcho-libertarianism offer?” However, EFL is only defending the thesis that 
in practice general preferences could not best be satisfied, overall and in the long-term, by 
infringements of liberty (not “rights of minorities”). The review does not offer any criticism 
other than this, ipso facto irrelevant, logical possibility that the thesis is mistaken. A similar 
confusion is found in the assertion that “Lester admits that he cannot in principle exclude 
horrific injustices” (with no page reference). Of course it is possible that liberty, welfare, and 
anarchy diverge radically “in principle” (or logically). The thesis being defended is that they 
do not significantly do so in reality. Only alleged real counterexamples are relevant to this. 
 
It is next asserted, without a page reference, that EFL “claims that people happen to be 
constituted so that standard injustices are not preference satisfying, all things considered.” 
What “standard injustices” are these? And how is this supposed to be related to how “people 
happen to be constituted”? It continues, “Such a response hinges long-term material prosperity, 
consonant with ordinary conceptions of justice, on a fragile preponderance of decent sentiments 
among the diverse lot of us”. EFL does not defend any theory of “justice” or refer to anything 
like “decent sentiments” as being necessary. It does have many positive philosophical 
arguments. So what if “critics will be undaunted”? What does that have to do with the 
soundness of any argument in the book? What are the alleged “empirical claims about human 
psychology, and … normative suppositions lurking in the background of the whole project” 
(except those alleged about property, which have already been answered)? 
 
As EFL is not about “showing that liberty can be an ‘uncontested concept’” it is hardly a fault 
that the book does not do so. On the contrary, it is entailed by critical rationalism that all 
concepts are contestable—even logical and mathematical ones. There is no “project of 
defending the market against charges of theoretical inconsistency”. The project is 
philosophically defending the positive compatibility of liberty, welfare, and anarchy in 
practice. 
 
Finally, it is a sort of confused understatement that, as the review concludes, “giving critics of 
libertarianism a run for their money can be an important and powerful buttress to the regime 
of liberty”. If we include all inconsistent theories, including moral ones, as implicit ‘critics’ 
(or, rather, criticisms), then there is nothing else we can usefully do (or if there is the review 
does not explain what it is). However, libertarianism—whether considered positively as in 
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EFL, or normatively as the review prefers—cannot have a supporting “buttress”: it can only be 
a conjecture to be explained and defended. 
J C Lester, August, 2002 (revised November 2020) 
